“European security doesn’t come for free”: societal resilience, a new defence commissioner, and budget challenges

As the three-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches, European leaders continue to grapple with aligning their security and defence strategies. On February 17, Studio Europa Maastricht will host the Europe Speech by Dutch Defence Minister Ruben Brekelmans, in which he will elaborate on the Netherlands’ stance within both the European and NATO contexts.

Ahead of the speech, Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Yf Reykers, Assistant Professor in International Relations at Maastricht University, about the EU’s security priorities, the role of the new defence commissioner, and the future of EU-NATO relations.

Shifting priorities

According to Reykers, Dutch defence priorities have increasingly emphasized societal resilience since the new government took office last summer:

“There is a growing focus on societal resilience, which was already included in the original government agreement and has been heavily emphasized by the Defence Minister. Additionally, there is an increasing emphasis on defence industrial development, which is a trend across Europe. The changes we see in the Netherlands reflect the broader European atmosphere under the new European Commission: a strong push for defence industrial development, continued support for Ukraine, and a renewed commitment to strengthening resilience. That said, there has been controversy between the foreign affairs department and Minister Brekelmans regarding whether or not to initiate Ukrainian negotiations.”

Strengthening EU-NATO relations

With Donald Trump once again pressuring NATO members to increase defence spending—and NATO secretary general Rutte supporting this push—European countries must take significant steps, Reykers argues:

“Rutte has been referred to as the ‘Trump whisperer,’ which may prove useful. Trump has always been vocal about NATO allies increasing their defence spending, and he’s not wrong in principle. However, the 5% GDP target he suggests is highly unrealistic. Even the U.S. spends just over 3% of its GDP on defence. This is likely a negotiation tactic: if he demands 5% and NATO ultimately agrees on a 3-3.5% target at the June summit in The Hague, it will still be perceived as a win. Rutte has also mentioned the 3-3.5% range, making it a realistic expectation.

However, this will pose significant challenges for most EU member states. Poland currently spends 4% of its GDP on defence, but it is an exception. Many countries, such as Belgium (1.3%), Italy (1.5%), and Spain (1.5%), are still struggling to meet the 2% target set in 2014 for 2024. These member states will face immense difficulty finding additional funds.”

This is where the EU could step in, Reykers suggests:

“The EU will likely focus more on joint projects, joint procurements, and strengthening the European defence industry. However, it must also explore new funding mechanisms. There has been talk of issuing Eurobonds for defence, similar to the COVID-19 recovery funds. Although member states previously rejected this idea, it may need to be revisited if spending targets rise to 3-3.5% of GDP.

“Although member states previously rejected the idea of Eurobonds, it may need to be revisited if spending targets rise to 3-3.5% of GDP.”

Between 2021 and 2024, EU member states collectively increased defence spending by over 30%, yet on average, they still only allocate 1.9-2% of GDP to defence. If the target moves to 3%, significantly more funds will be required. Ultimately, this money will have to come from new taxes or budget cuts, which, in most European countries, would mean reducing social welfare spending. This sparks the classic ‘guns vs. butter’ debate—whether to allocate funds to military defence or social programs. While it is a false dichotomy, it remains a central political challenge.”

The price of security

The rise of far-right parties across Europe adds another layer of complexity, particularly with upcoming elections in Germany and France. Many of these parties oppose increased NATO funding and continued aid to Ukraine.

“This is a major concern because two of Europe’s most influential countries are facing domestic political shifts, making it difficult to expect strong leadership from them. However, the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat—including increased migration flows and economic instability—could also pose significant challenges for these right-wing parties. In the end, even those skeptical of defence spending may have to acknowledge the long-term costs of a Russian victory. We’ve already seen examples of pragmatic compromises. Take Hungary, for instance. Despite its initial resistance to EU sanctions on Russia, it eventually dropped its veto in exchange for concessions on energy security,” he adds.

“In the end, even those skeptical of defence spending may have to acknowledge the long-term costs of a Russian victory.”

Beyond institutional coordination, Brussels must also work to build public awareness of the costs associated with security and defence, Reykers concludes:

“The EU needs to do more to communicate the necessity of defence investments. European security has been taken for granted for too long. While Europe remains a peace project, peace requires a credible defence strategy. Public information campaigns could help, similar to Sweden’s efforts to educate citizens on societal resilience. While Europe may not need the same level of preparedness initiatives, it does need to raise awareness that security comes at a price.”