Leaders of the European Parliament’s far-right bloc, Patriots for Europe, held their first official summit in Madrid over the weekend under the slogan “Make Europe Great Again.” The gathering featured Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italian Deputy Premier Matteo Salvini, the leader of France’s National Rally Marine Le Pen, and the Netherlands’ PVV leader Geert Wilders. The summit focused primarily on migration and praised re-elected U.S. President Donald Trump, despite his threats to increase tariffs on European imports.
Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Dr Luana Russo, Associate Professor in Political Behavior and Quantitative Methods at Maastricht University, about the impact of the far-right alliance on the broader trajectory of European politics and their push to import Trump’s nationalist approach to the EU.
United in spirit, divided over Ukraine
Patriots for Europe was formed after the June 2024 European elections and consists of 86 MEPs from 14 countries, making it the third-largest voting bloc in the European Parliament. However, despite their goal of unifying Europe’s far-right, some of the most influential parties—such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Poland’s Law and Justice— did not join the new group, hence did not attend the Madrid summit. Russo points out:
“This is a bloc that is a bit more radical than the European Conservatives and Reformists, which include Brothers of Italy and Poland’s Law and Justice, because their approach is what we call “institutionalist”. The Patriots are a different beast—they are more extreme. They come from a political tradition that doesn’t really believe in changing from within; they believe in changing from the outside. So, the aim is definitely to be a disruptive force.”
While the Madrid summit had a vague and overarching agenda, its inspiration from Trump’s rhetoric was evident:
“Of course, they are trying to tap into the broader sentiment developing with Trump’s election, so there is this conservative push. You can also see it in their slogan—because they essentially borrowed the American one. But instead of MAGA (Make America Great Again), it’s MEGA—Make Europe Great Again. In this sense, it’s effective in signalling to voters what they are signing up for, uniting themselves under this far-right, disruptive, non-institutionalist group.”
Russo warns that while some of their demands might seem extreme, far-right ideas are already influencing European policies:
“When you look at what they concretely want to do, particularly in areas where they have significant support, we should be concerned that they will push forward with it. But they will certainly advocate for their positions at a normative level. And we’ve already seen that many far-right demands have been accepted or at least considered in shaping new European policies.”

One of the most divisive issues within the far-right bloc is foreign policy, particularly their stance on the war in Ukraine.
“These are political leaders who are not very diplomatic—they struggle with compromise. At some point, foreign policy issues, like the war in Ukraine, will spark tensions, and this is one of the biggest divisions I see within the bloc. We don’t yet know how they will handle these challenges, and that’s a clear weakness,” Russo points out.
“For example, Denmark’s People’s Party is pro-Ukraine, but Orbán is not. So, you can see that foreign policy is an area where divisions can easily arise. On the other hand, on broader cultural issues—such as migration, diversity and inclusivity, or European integration—they have a relatively consistent stance,” she adds.
The Trump challenge
At the summit, Marine Le Pen declared: “We are the only ones who can talk with the new Trump administration.” Russo acknowledges some truth in this claim but warns against underestimating Brussels:
“I think there is some truth in her words for two reasons. Trump has shown—and Elon Musk as well, since he is now a very prominent figure in U.S. politics—that they are not afraid to say things that would have previously been considered unspeakable. For example, when Musk endorsed AfD as the only right choice for Germany. If you remember, in Trump’s first term, he was extremely supportive of Boris Johnson in the UK. Trump is not a leader who holds back—he will say things and offer support when it aligns with his interests. So, there will likely be a strong understanding between this far-right bloc and the Trump administration. However, I wouldn’t underestimate European and national institutions in the EU. It may be more challenging to deal with Trump, but claiming, as Marine Le Pen did, that they are the only ones who can talk to him is too presumptuous. Yes, they share a similar worldview, which makes personal interactions easier. But institutionally, I wouldn’t be as dismissive as Marine Le Pen. Trump will have to engage with the European Union. He may not follow diplomatic protocol—he’s a disruptive political figure—but there are experienced leaders in Brussels who know how to navigate this dynamic.”
“There will likely be a strong understanding between this far-right bloc and the Trump administration.”
The German elections gamble
Despite AfD not attending the Madrid summit, Matteo Salvini hailed their growing popularity as a “historic opportunity” ahead of Germany’s federal elections on February 23, where AfD is polling in second place. However, Russo does not expect the election to drastically alter European politics:
“The far-right is gaining momentum. I’m quite confident that AfD will perform well—that’s what the polls indicate. But last time, the polls were overly optimistic. As a quantitative expert, I know that polling these groups is difficult due to selection bias—many of their voters refuse to answer surveys and estimate corrections are at times over-corrections.”
“Of course, Salvini, for his own benefit, tends to exaggerate the significance of AfD’s rise. We know that when far-right parties gain votes, mainstream right-wing parties tend to shift further right. That’s something we are witnessing in the Netherlands, where the far-right is in government. In general, politicians try to appeal to the median voter, and since the median voter is now leaning more right, everything moves in that direction.”
“We know that when far-right parties gain votes, mainstream right-wing parties tend to shift further right.”
Beyond electoral results, Russo highlights the deeper societal implications:
“Another emerging phenomenon, which could be dangerous for liberal democracies, is the shift in social norms. At first, far-right leaders—like AfD—start gaining more votes. Then, as people see them succeeding, they feel emboldened to break taboos. This leads to the normalization of the extreme right, creating a cycle. I think we are at the peak of that cycle now.”
“Historically, far-right parties were marginalized. But in Germany, for example, the CDU moved toward the center, leaving space on the right for AfD to grow. Still, Germany has a strong silent majority, as we saw when AfD’s so-called ‘reimmigration’ plan sparked mass protests. This is a moment of political testing—let’s see what comes of it,” she adds.
“Another emerging phenomenon, which could be dangerous for liberal democracies, is the shift in social norms.”
Young voters and the future of Europe
Despite the rise of far-right parties and increasing nationalist sentiment among young Europeans (particularly those aged 18–24), Russo does not expect Patriots for Europe to significantly disrupt the dominance of the European People’s Party (EPP) and Socialists & Democrats (S&D) in the next European elections:
“It’s true that, in some countries, younger voters strongly supported the far-right. That was definitely the case in the Netherlands, but not in Italy. There, education played a decisive role—less-educated voters were more likely to support the far-right. Another trend is that the youngest generation—those still teenagers now—actually seem less conservative.”
However, Russo warns about the way European elections are perceived by many voters:
“European elections are what we call ‘second-order elections.’ Many citizens still view the EU as remote and don’t feel these elections have a direct impact on their lives. As a result, they tend to vote more sincerely—often using their vote as a protest. This is why we see far-right breakthroughs at the European level. In this sense, one could argue that European elections contribute to the normalization of the extreme right—something that European institutions should take seriously,” she concludes.

Luana Russo is Associate Professor in Political Behavior and Quantitative Methods at Maastricht University. Luana’s research interests focuses on elections, political attitudes and behaviors, political psychology, affective polarization, and negative partisanship.
