As misinformation and conspiracy theories continue to shape public discourse, efforts to combat their spread have become more critical than ever. In the context of growing concerns about digital platforms’ influence, Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Professor of Radicalisation, Extremism, and Conspiracy Thinking at Maastricht University, and one of the authors of our new policy brief collection on digitalisation. We discussed how the EU’s Digital Services Act is dealing with reducing misinformation and conspiracy theories on social media.
Likes vs. truth
In his policy brief, van Prooijen argues that, contrary to popular belief, misinformation and conspiracy theories are predominantly spread by human users rather than algorithms:
“People talk about algorithms like they’re something evil, but how harmful algorithms are depends on how they are programmed, and they are programmed differently on each platform. This is, of course, an area where the Digital Services Act can play a role, but even so, research shows that algorithms do play a role in the spread of misinformation—it’s just not the most important factor. Misinformation and conspiracy theories are primarily spread by humans. Algorithms mostly pick them up if humans read them and are interested in them.”
“Misinformation and conspiracy theories are primarily spread by humans. Algorithms mostly pick them up if humans read them and are interested in them.”
The expert explains the psychological motivations behind why people share false information online, even when they know it might be untrue:
“You have the people who create disinformation because they know it’s false and use it to mislead others. A small number of them is responsible for most disinformation online. These are sometimes referred to as superspreaders. But the key question is why do people who receive it in their feeds and inboxes forward it to their friends or post it in their groups? Research suggests that, quite often, this is not malevolent intent, nor is it stupidity. It’s because people use social media for different reasons.
For instance, people are on Facebook because of social connections—they want to connect with their friends. They’re there for their social identity—they want to be part of a group. There is a lot of evidence suggesting that this could be a motivation to spread misinformation. Imagine you’re a Republican, and you get a funny message about Kamala Harris or some news that makes your political opponent look bad. It’s tempting to spread it in your network because you know you’re going to get social rewards: likes, signs of approval, and agreement from others. That’s often what people look for on social media. In that process, they become less attentive to the possibility that the information might be false.”
Reason does matter
In his policy brief, van Prooijen also suggests that the need to “appease their in-group” can drive people to share misinformation. Mitigating the impact of this dynamic—particularly when it comes to misinformation surrounding important global events like the ongoing war in Ukraine or the COVID-19 pandemic—is one of the key tasks of policymaking on digitalisation:
“The lesson we’ve learned is that people don’t necessarily want to spread misinformation. If people learn that what they’re sharing is likely false, it decreases their willingness to spread it. There’s a paradox here. My specialty is mostly conspiracy theories, but I believe misinformation works similarly. One of the main reasons why people fall for it is due to emotions and social identity considerations. Somehow, this has led many people to believe that reason doesn’t matter. But reason does matter.
Pointing out that something is just wrong and explaining why can actually make a difference. Looking at positive social identity, people can also be called out on that by their friends and groups, and that can make them think twice. It does make a difference to debunk false information and to issue warning labels, for instance. That’s the key policy message I wanted to convey with this brief. The belief that misinformation is driven by emotions doesn’t mean that facts and reason are unimportant. Pointing people to what’s true and what isn’t is crucial.”
“The belief that misinformation is driven by emotions doesn’t mean that facts and reason are unimportant. Pointing people to what’s true and what isn’t is crucial.”
Given the increasing political polarization in Europe and the U.S., van Prooijen believes media literacy and education should play an important role in curbing the spread of harmful narratives:
“Nowadays, young people are far more likely to get their news from social media than from traditional news outlets. This means that, from a young age, people are exposed to a lot of misinformation. This problem isn’t new—propaganda existed as far back as the 1930s. We just didn’t have the internet then, but the amount of misinformation, the exposure to it, and the number of discrepancies one person can spread now is overwhelming. I think that preparing young people for this and increasing media literacy is of utmost importance because it’s one of the drivers of polarization—people’s ability to find their own tribes and truths online. I’m not saying it’s the only explanation for what’s happening right now, but I do think it contributes to it.”
Community notes vs. fact-checkers
“It is most effective and believable if fact-checkers do it. I sympathise with the rose-coloured ideology of community notes, but I also think it’s a little naïve, because there are people out there who actively and deliberately try to deceive us all, and fact-checkers are better equipped to resist that than community notes.”
However, given that social identity and in-group dynamics play a significant role in how information is shared online, the expert underscores that there is little hope digital platforms can ever truly be neutral spaces for information exchange:
“I think that’s difficult because there is freedom of speech, and that’s very important. But where’s the boundary between unorthodox opinion and false information? That’s not always easy to assess. I prefer the label-warning approach. There is evidence that it can work when implemented well because it doesn’t censor information, but it does point people to what’s false. Completely neutral spaces are hard to imagine.
Research shows that on platforms like Facebook people select ideologically congruent news. Users add to their friend groups people they met on holidays but they may have completely different views and opinions on things. The reality is that people are far more likely to click on headlines and read information that already aligns with their views. So, users sort of create their own echo chambers, even when the platform itself is diverse. That’s a very different one to tackle.”
Jan-Willem van Prooijen is Endowed Professor of Radicalization, Extremism, and Conspiracy Thinking at the Department of Criminal Law and Criminology of Maastricht University. Moreover, he is Associate Professor of Psychology at VU Amsterdam, and Senior Researcher at the Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR).
