With the end of the transatlantic relationship, the immediate focus for Europe is on rearming Europe and helping Ukraine. But to defend ourselves long-term, we need to enlarge Europe’s security space and integrate Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans into the EU. This implies helping EU candidate countries democratise in earnest.
Gergana Noutcheva | 09 April 2025
A new European security order
The next decade will be crucial for building and fortifying the pillars of a new European security order. Europe’s time to take its own defence seriously has arrived. With Russia threatening to strike beyond Ukraine by the end of the decade, the urgency to equip the continent with the means to defend itself could not be higher.
The European Commission has already tabled its proposals for boosting the defence of Europe, but the endeavour’s success will ultimately depend on how united the EU member states are to deepen defence integration.
The EU, however, cannot be safe and secure if its immediate Eastern neighbours are left to the mercy of a resurgent Russia. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans had fallen into oblivion until Russia’s invasion of Ukraine made it clear that uniting the continent is the way to bring peace to it. Enlarging the EU is necessary for Europe’s security and the protection of Europe’s political values.
Building security and protecting European values
Building security for Europe and helping candidate countries democratise and integrate into the European family go hand in hand. This is particularly obvious in the current geopolitical climate when external authoritarian powers, like Russia, seek to undermine European security by weakening European democracies.
In the past decade or so, the EU did not intervene decisively in support of fledgling democracies in the Western Balkans and beyond. Its enlargement and neighbourhood policies prioritised security building over democracy promotion, thus contributing to the rise of authoritarianism in many of the candidate countries. This was short-sighted at best.
To help the EU candidates advance democracy, the EU should pressure corrupt political regimes using its accession leverage and support societal democracy and rule-of-law movements. Serbia and Georgia are two cases in point. For months, brave students have led the societal resistance against the democratic erosion in both countries without much European backing.
At the same time, the EU has done little to penalise these regimes’ leaders. The EU has the instruments to sanction autocrats in power and empower pro-democracy forces, it just needs the political resolve to put its toolbox to good use. It has mastered the use of ‘smart sanctions’ and can target democratic wrongdoers. It can also engage in public diplomacy to amplify the domestic societal efforts for more democracy.
Fostering public support for EU enlargement in the EU
It is not enough for the EU to support democracy in candidate countries. EU leaders will also have to explain to the European public how high the stakes are in further enlarging the EU. A recent pan-European opinion poll reveals that the EU public is split: 38% of European citizens favour accepting new EU members, 31% are against it, and 20% remain indifferent. An enlarging EU can only credibly claim to represent democratic values if its leaders seek to foster public support for including new member states.
The European Union has been forged through crises. The times of greatest uncertainty have been the most transformative for the EU. This is another moment that calls for both deepening and widening of the European project for the sake of a “Europe whole, free and at peace“.
This article is part of an opinion piece series on the future of Europe and the Europe that could be. It’s produced in a collaboration between Studio Europa Maastricht and The European Correspondent.
Gergana Noutcheva is an associate professor in international relations at Maastricht University. Her research focuses on EU enlargement and neighbourhood policies and on democratization in the Balkans and the post-Soviet space.
