The Netherlands is preparing to host its first NATO summit in The Hague late June. A team of experts from the independent Policy and Operations Evaluation department (IOB) of the Dutch Foreign Ministry has recently published a report “Stronger together? Evaluation of Dutch foreign and security policy towards the EU and NATO, 2020-2024.” One of the authors of the report Rens Willems, senior policy researcher at IOB, spoke with Studio Europa Maastricht about the effectiveness of the Dutch dual-track security policy and how can the Netherlands improve the coherence between NATO and the EU.
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No strategy without structure
The report, prepared by Willems and his colleagues Trix van Mierlo, Daan Boelens, and Sabine Mengelberg, highlights the absence of a clear Dutch guiding strategy for EU and NATO engagement during the last five years. Given the urgency of Europe’s current security challenges, Willems believes it’s essential to come up with a strategy that is both actionable and future-proof:
“NATO has always been the cornerstone of Dutch security policy. But in the past decades the EU has become a more prominent security actor. And therefore the EU also gradually became an increasingly important actor in Dutch security policies. In 2020 this was formalised in a ‘dual track approach’ to NATO and the EU. This implied that the two organisations formally became the main vehicles through which at the international level the Netherlands would pursue its security interests.”
However, the report finds that the Netherlands has not clearly articulated how to approach the two organisations within this dual-track policy.
“What we found is that since 2020 there has not been a clear articulation of what this dual track approach meant in practice. There was this idea that the Netherlands would support and strengthen both the EU and NATO in order to also support Dutch security. There was the assumption that both organisations would complement each other but there was not a clear articulation of how the Netherlands would strive to pursue complementarity between these two organisations.”
Willems explains that current policy documents mostly focus on avoiding duplication, but fail to explain what complementarity between the EU and NATO should look like in practice.
“What we saw in many policy documents is that the emphasis was largely on preventing duplication, so phrasing the policy in terms of what it should not be. But there was no clear articulation of what the complementarity between these two organisations should look like, on the basis of which the Netherlands could determine its priorities for both organisations.”
For Willems, a strategy should be broad, adaptive, and built on a realistic understanding of how the EU and NATO can reinforce each other. That includes planning for possible changes in Europe’s security environment and reassessing long-held assumptions:
“This strategy should take into consideration both desired and undesired scenarios, for instance for development of the transatlantic relationship. And there should be regular reflection on the validity of the underlying assumptions.”
From Biden anomaly to Trump effect
The report also warns about the Netherlands’ strong dependency on the US within NATO—at a time when US commitment to European security is increasingly uncertain. In anticipation of a potentially reduced US role, Willems says Europe has no other way but to create a more independent defence capacity:
“I don’t think there is a choice really. If European countries, including the Netherlands, have a strong dependency on the US, and the US is clearly indicating that it is less interested in providing security on the European continent, this implies that Europe should take more responsibility. It’s also something that the US has been saying for quite a long time, it’s not something that started now with Trump II. It already started with Obama who already urged Europe to do more, and this continued under Trump I.”
Europe’s hopes for renewed US leadership under Biden may have been misplaced, he adds:
“With Biden there was an assumption that the US would be back and that there was a renewed interest the European continent. The assumption was also that Trump I was an anomaly. But it appears that Biden was the anomaly and there is a clear trend of a decreasing interest in Europe going back several US presidents.”
“With Biden there was an assumption that the US would be back and that there was a renewed interest the European continent. The assumption was also that Trump I was an anomaly.”
Willems stresses how challenging this is for a country like the Netherlands, which is traditionally very transatlantic in its outlook:
“What we find in the report, is that there was recognition that the US was becoming less interested in supporting security at the European continent, but the strategy was to keep the US on board as much as possible.”
That may be changing now—but slowly, the expert believes:
“I think right now we reached a point where there is much agreement that Europe should do much more for its own defence. There may be some disagreement – and uncertainty – about how much the US can still be relied upon. But there is a common understanding that European countries can’t rely on the US as much as it currently is doing. But this is very complex of course. You cannot change the current level of dependence overnight. Therefore, maintaining a strong transatlantic relationship remains important, but strengthening European security and defence cooperation must be a priority.”
New leaders, old problems
Considering recent leadership changes in both the EU and NATO—now headed by former Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte—there may be room for renewed cooperation:
“When we conducted the evaluation, many people we talked to predicted that the new leadership both at the NATO side and EU side would be a new stimulus for EU–NATO cooperation. For one, the new leadership has a much better interpersonal relationship between them than prior under Jens Stoltenberg. Also, Mark Rutte coming from an EU country and having a lot of experience in the EU, moving towards NATO he took this experience with him. That all signalled that there would be increased opportunities for the two organisations to cooperate,” Willems explains.
“At the same time we have to acknowledge that president Trump is known not to be a big fan of the EU,” he warns.
For Willems, the dynamic is defined by two opposing trends:
“There are two conflicting developments: on one hand you have new leadership in the EU and NATO that’s more open to cooperation and you have Trump who’s probably less keen on that developing further. But in general there is much potential for complementarity between the two organisations. So where political space permits, further cooperation could potentially mutually strengthen the EU and NATO .”
Willems also points out that NATO and the EU have distinct, but complementary strengths:
“They both have their respected qualities and they are also working on overlapping domains. NATO is very good in planning and organising military defence. Military defence relies on a defence industry. Who’s good at organising industry and cooperation? It’s the EU. So there is potential there.”
He also stresses the importance of combining their capabilities in response to new types of threats:
“Besides conventional conflict, there are a lot of cyber and hybrid threats right now. Both EU and NATO are working on that but they have their own distinct instruments to respond. NATO has military means. For instance, NATO is currently patrolling the Baltic Sea as a response to the sabotage underwater cables. The EU has legislative powers and subsidies that can push and support countries to strengthen their critical infrastructure. And the EU can respond with sanctions. So there is a potential to mutual reinforcement.”
The cost of coherence
With the Dutch government expressing reluctance to increase EU financial contributions and opposing joint EU loans—yet simultaneously advocating for a stronger European defence industry—the strategic necessity for greater EU-level investment is becoming harder to ignore.
“In the report we identify this as a tension. And in Dutch politics right now it’s a subject of debate, which is understandable. You could see them as competing policy priorities: fiscal caution versus increased defence investment.”
However, according to Willems, investment alone won’t be enough:
“Of course, the report is focused on security policy, and not fiscal policy. We didn’t investigate what would be the most appropriate financial solution. But what we do note, is that strengthening the European defence industry will require significant investments. And, crucially, it also requires a significant increase in cooperation between European countries and to develop and buy defence equipment together. Because a big problem with the European defence market is its high level of fragmentation. You see that a lot of countries are increasing their national defence spending budgets, but that does not necessarily lead to increased cooperation.”
Willems believes that to address Europe’s fragmented defence market, shared financing could be key:
“If you want to tackle the fragmented nature of the European defence market you should strive for increased cooperation. One way to do that could be by using common funding to stimulate increased cooperation between European countries,” he concludes.
Rens Willems is a senior policy researcher at the independent Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He works on studies in the areas of security, diplomacy and development. He obtained his PhD from Utrecht University on security dynamics in fragile contexts.
