As the Netherlands recovers from hosting its first NATO summit, where alliance leaders committed to investing 5% of their countries’ GDP annually in defence by 2035, questions remain about where this money will come from. Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Clemens Kool, Chair of Macroeconomics and International Monetary Economics at the School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University. Ahead of his farewell lecture, “Euro(pe): The Final Countdown?” on 4 July, Kool shared his views on the current economic challenges and the future of the European Union.
Economic vs political
Following the decisions announced at the NATO summit in The Hague last week, Kool points out that the economic side of reaching these goals is less worrying than the political one:
“The economic side is the easiest. If every country were to start spending as much as they promised at the NATO summit, that would be a massive fiscal expenditure push, leading to much more pressure on the labour market and on industrial capacity.
Of course, that won’t have the same effect across the EU, it depends on where you spend it. If you spend all of it on American equipment, the economic impact in terms of internal demand in the EU would be relatively limited. But if spent within the EU, countries with large defence industries or subcontractors would benefit a lot. There would be extra economic activity in those countries. The Netherlands is somewhere in the middle. We don’t have a large defence industry, but we do provide a lot of intermediate goods – like electronic components – to German and French military manufacturers.”
Kool highlights that while most Europeans want more security, few are willing to pay for it from their pockets:
“Most people are in favour of more defence spending. But very few people like to cut down their own expenditures. If you ask the general electorate, they’ll say: cut development aid, or cut migration costs. Even if you wanted to, which I don’t think is a very good idea, that wouldn’t be enough. What will happen is that governments will issue more debt. There will be more debt financing, which in a catch-up phase would make sense, because we’ve been underspending on defence for quite a while. After all, the benefits of that investment will also go to future generations, because they’ll be more safe. But you can’t borrow forever to pay for it. At some point, you’ll have to find structural solutions.”

Pressure on European economies
Kool adds that if the spending were to happen all at once, it could create pressure on European economies:
“If we started spending all at once, that would put pressure on most economies in Europe, depending a bit on where we are in the business cycle. If we’re in a downturn, it might actually help. But if we’re already in a boom, it’ll be inflationary. The more we finance this with debt, the more inflationary it will be, and the harder it’ll be for the European Central Bank to contain that inflation. Then you get a situation with expansive fiscal policy and very contractionary monetary policy because the ECB has to keep inflation down. That’s a problem.”
The 2035 timeline, however, helps mitigate this risk:
“On the positive side, it’s not very likely that every country will start spending this much right away. We have until 2035 to reach that 5% target, so there’s time. It’ll be a very gradual path. The first impact will be slow, it’s not something we’ll see next year. But in the longer run, it will need to be financed, and if that’s done with debt, it’ll give an extra push to the economy,” Kool says.
Financial power of Brussels
When it comes to whether the EU has the tools to help countries struggling to meet these obligations, Kool reminds that Brussels is smaller than some people think:
“Even though everyone blames Brussels for whatever happens in Europe, essentially Brussels is very small. The financial power of Brussels is only about 1% of total EU GDP. Almost all decisions made in Brussels are intergovernmental. That means the heads of state need to agree before the Commission can do anything. Politically and economically, the Commission itself has no direct power. It’s increasingly acting as a coordinator, especially after so many crises in the past 15 years. There’s a need for a leading market-maker, a coordinator to bring countries together. But in the end, real spending and decision-making power lies with the nation states. That’s also true for defence. Each country needs to spend more, but the trick is to do it efficiently. Not every country should decide on its own which tank or aircraft to build. There needs to be a strategy to make smart decisions together.”
“Not every country should decide on its own which tank or aircraft to build. There needs to be a strategy to make smart decisions together.”
Kool points to the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 initiative, already underway before the NATO summit, as an example:
“The initiative says we need to spend €800 billion more on defence in Europe. Most of that will be done by the member states. The European Commission has said: ‘If you need to borrow to do this, we’ll relax the financial constraints on national debt.’ The EU itself will borrow around €150 billion in Eurobonds, but it won’t spend that money. It’ll distribute it to member states, so they can finance military spending a bit more cheaply than if they borrowed individually.”

A stronger centre
Kool believes stronger central governance will eventually be needed if Europe is to meet its ambitions:
“In my view, we need a stronger centre. Given all the external and internal threats – geopolitical tensions, military issues, climate change – these are all challenges that individual countries cannot handle alone. But at the moment, the EU can’t either, because it has very little power and very little money.
Right now, all member states have to agree before action is taken. Unless we’re in a crisis, that takes a long time. There can be vetoes from individual countries. We need to improve the governance of the EU. That’s also something that was mentioned in the Draghi report on innovation and productivity. He said that we need better decision procedures which is a polite way to say that we should give more power to the European Union to make decisions in some areas. That could include defence. Coordination alone may not be enough.”
Yet political resistance to this remains strong, Kool points out:
“Of course, national politicians don’t like giving up power. They claim they’re protecting national interests. We also see populist movements in many countries that are more anti-EU than pro-EU. But the most recent Eurobarometer asked specific questions about what people want the EU to do. And there’s a large majority of citizens who want the EU to play a bigger role in protecting them against crises and external threats. There’s also support for giving the EU more resources to be unified and coordinated.
So there is broad support from citizens who understand that we need a stronger EU but at the same time, they’re not necessarily willing to pay the price. It’s a kind of schizophrenic position: people understand the need, but they don’t want to give up control or money.”
“It’s a kind of schizophrenic position: people understand the need, but they don’t want to give up control or money.”
Reflecting on the current trade tensions with the US administration, Kool predicts it to be a long-lasting trend:
“There has always been a part of the American foreign policy that was isolationist. Right now, the US is more inward-looking. I think we should prepare for a decade where the US focuses more on the Pacific, China, and Asia than on Europe. Tariffs and trade wars may be more specific to the current US president and his views on free trade. That might change with a new administration. But the broader trend remains: we’ve relied on the US economically and militarily for 80 years, but that link has weakened already over the past decade. It’s not going back to what it was.”
The expert adds the EU will have to become more self-reliant:
“We need to realise that most of Europe’s trade is with other European countries. But less global trade means higher costs – both for us and for the Americans. To remain resilient, we need to invest in innovation and productivity. That would be necessary even if the US hadn’t changed its policies.
Our population is aging, our labour force is shrinking, and our productivity and innovation levels are not where they should be. The Draghi report makes a strong case that no country can tackle this alone. We need EU-level coordination.”
Kool believes external pressure might bring Europeans closer together:
“In general, external enemies lead to more unity. That’s not a guarantee and that doesn’t mean that someone won’t try to benefit from strong disagreements internally but generally the stronger the external threat the more everybody understands that internal unity and cohesion is a very powerful force. We’ve seen it in the Russia-Ukraine war. Even if not everybody is exactly on the same page, the EU has managed to put together support packages for Ukraine, has pushed through sanctions against Russia. I think the external threat has been a decisive power in that.
Kool urges Europeans to look for similarities, instead of emphasizing our differences:
“If you consider how the rest of the world operates then you see that our internal similarities are much stronger than differences. If you ask somebody in Latin America or Asia or Africa about European countries, they don’t see these differences. We may think that Portuguese or Hungarian or Dutch are very-very different but for the rest of the world it’s just Europe. Stressing all these differences doesn’t help us. I think to stay relevant economically and geopolitically we need more unity. It’s important for the EU to take initiatives to do things that make people see how important the EU is, to send a positive message that actually is visible to citizens, so that their feeling of European citizenship grows.”

Prof Dr Clemens Kool is Professor of “Macroeconomics and International Monetary Economics” at the
School of Business and Economics at Maastricht University and currently serves as interim-director of UNU-MERIT.
