Foreign interference has become a recurring subplot in European politics. From Romania’s cancelled presidential election to Germany’s far-right surge, Russia has been accused of using disinformation and covert financing to tilt the playing field. The latest battleground was Moldova, where President Maia Sandu urged citizens not to be “bought” by Moscow as she sought to keep the country on its path toward EU membership. With the Czech Republic parliamentary elections on the horizon, the question is increasingly urgent: has foreign interference become the new normal for Europe? And what role should Brussels play in safeguarding democratic processes? Studio Europa Maastricht discussed it with Gergana Noutcheva, Associate Professor in International Relations and European Foreign Policy at Maastricht University, who specialises in EU enlargement policy and democracy promotion.
Russian playbook
Following the dramatic election campaign in Moldova, Council of Europe Secretary-General Alain Berset told media this is a “wake-up call” for Europe, predicting that disinformation and foreign interference will become long-term challenges to democratic processes. According to Noutcheva, Russian tactics are neither new nor particularly subtle and even established European democracies are not immune to them.
“The Russians act out of the KGB rulebook and they are doing what they’ve been doing for decades,” she explained. “Where they have entry points through secret services, paid political actors, or civil society they will not shy away from exploiting them. For me what is more important is how resilient the country is from within against such threats.”
In Moldova, that resilience was tested when the electoral authority barred two pro-Russian parties just days before the vote. Far from undermining democracy, Noutcheva sees such measures as proof of institutional strength.
“I don’t consider it an act that undermines the democratic process. I rather see it as an act of institutional resilience,” she argued, pointing to the clandestine nature of Russia’s methods. “Yes, the measure is extreme, but the scale of intervention was visibly so high that in the eyes of the majority of Moldovan citizens I don’t think it looked illegitimate.”
Invasion from within
Noutcheva recalled how Romanian authorities resorted to extraordinary measures during their presidential race, while evidence of Russian interference has surfaced in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic:
“This is what the Russians do when they want to conquer a country from within, using soft means. If they can establish a Russia-friendly government by paying some money here and there, they’d rather do that than a full-scale invasion like in Ukraine. It’s cheaper.”
“If they can establish a Russia-friendly government by paying some money here and there, they’d rather do that than a full-scale invasion like in Ukraine.“
Add to it the ambiguity of interference, always leaving room for doubt or denial, making it harder to counter. Yet, the expert believes awareness within the EU has improved: “Probably they are not doing enough, but in terms of diagnosis everyone is pretty conscious of what Russia is capable of. It’s on the radar, and it’s registered as a high risk.”
Brussels’ rules and bread-and-butter issues
What, then, can Brussels do? Noutcheva identifies two main avenues. First, institutional reform within the EU itself. The unanimity rule has long hampered EU enlargement decisions, allowing single member states, like Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece to block progress for individual candidates. Moving to qualified majority voting (QMV) for enlargement-related steps, such as opening or closing negotiation chapters, could help prevent national vetoes from paralysing the process, the expert explains:
“This is not a healthy status quo. Let’s hope there will be an agreement to move towards QMV at least when it comes to interim enlargement decisions. Brussels can deblock the process.”
Second, and perhaps more importantly, is delivering tangible benefits to citizens in candidate countries like Moldova, who reaffirmed their commitment to European values, but are still waiting for Brussels to commit to their future in the EU in return.
“This election was won purely on the geopolitical cleavage: Europe vs Russia, democracy vs dictatorship,” Noutcheva noted. “But you can’t keep winning elections on a geopolitical ticket. The government needs to deliver on bread-and-butter issues: fighting poverty, improving livelihoods, investing in communities. That’s where Brussels can really make a difference.”
“This election was won purely on the geopolitical cleavage: Europe vs Russia, democracy vs dictatorship”
Lessons from Georgia, opportunities in Moldova
Sceptics may point to Georgia, another Russian neighbour, where Brussels’ support did not prevent democratic backsliding, which led to the half of the country’s EU accession negotiations. Noutcheva acknowledged the limits of Brussels’ influence in such cases:
“There is no panacea. The EU can work better with governments that are on its side. It doesn’t know how to deal with autocrats. We saw that in Georgia, we see that in Serbia as well. The EU doesn’t know how to use its sanctioning mechanisms well to make rising autocrats fall in line.”
Yet she sees Moldova as a different story: a society that has mobilised against foreign interference and a government with a strong pro-European mandate. “It’s a window of opportunity,” she emphasised. “The stars are aligned – citizens, government, and Brussels are all pulling in the same direction. It’s a win-win.”
Gergana Noutcheva is Associate Professor in International Relations and Jean Monnet Chair at Maastricht University. Her research focuses EU enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. She has published extensively on EU democracy promotion and comparative democratization of Eastern Europe.
