Trump’s Board of Peace, unveiled last week at the World Economic Forum in Davos with Donald Trump as lifetime chairman, was initially presented as a vehicle for Gaza’s reconstruction. Observers now note that the body is being promoted as a broader global conflict-resolution mechanism, leading critics to question whether it is intended to rival or sidestep the United Nations. Most European countries invited to join have either declined or are still considering, while a growing list of autocratic states that have agreed to join is raising alarm among experts and even close U.S. allies.
Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Giselle Bosse, Professor of European Union External Democracy Support at Maastricht University, about what the Board’s composition and trajectory signal for global diplomacy, multilateral world order and democratic accountability.
US vs. UN
Bosse interprets the Board’s makeup as emblematic of emerging global dynamics around authority and governance, explaining that it effectively rewards autocratic leadership and normalizes their behaviour:
“The Peace Board tells us much more about power politics than about peace. It is essentially a transactional version of Trump’s alternative United Nations. You could even describe it as a Trump-owned US company, with Trump as chairman and majority shareholder. The fact that autocratic leaders such as Belarus’ Lukashenka, Russia’s Putin, or Hungary’s Orbán were invited is highly revealing. These are leaders who value international prestige and photo opportunities, but who have shown little to no commitment to accountability or international law. They are not joining because they care about peace; they are joining because participation legitimises their leadership internationally. It gives them status, even as they continue to undermine international law, democratic norms, and human rights.”
“The fact that autocratic leaders such as Belarus’ Lukashenka, Russia’s Putin, or Hungary’s Orbán were invited is highly revealing”
Bosse compares the board to Autocracy Inc. described in the popular book about modern autocracies written by the American journalist and historian Anne Applebaum:
“This board embraces or encourages oligarchic structures, kleptocratic financial structures and corruption and it has zero accountability, which is exactly what this Autocracy Inc. is about.”
In elaborating on what that looks like in practice, Bosse points to concrete cases that she sees as illustrative of transactional interests behind participation:
“Take two examples that are already being discussed publicly. Why does Albania want to join? Because Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner – who is also involved in the Board of Peace – has recently received strategic investor status from the Albanian government for a billion-euro luxury resort project, as reported by Reuters. And why did Bulgaria join? Bulgarian media report that the decision followed public pressure from Delyan Peevski, a US-sanctioned oligarch, and was implemented by a caretaker prime minister without parliamentary approval. The move has triggered a strong domestic backlash and reinforced concerns that participation in the Board is being driven by transactional and corrupt elite interests rather than by democratic accountability.”
Bosse situates the Board’s approach to Gaza within this broader pattern of transactional governance:
“The way Trump’s Gaza reconstruction plan is framed – almost like an investment project or a theme park – fits perfectly into this Autocracy Inc. logic. That is deeply worrying, because it treats reconstruction not as a political and humanitarian process grounded in rights and accountability, but as a business venture.”
Europe’s answer
Analysing Europe’s response, Bosse stresses that the EU’s largely united stance to keep its distance from the new organisation is strategically justified. She argues that joining offers minimal leverage and substantial risk:
“I would say it’s the right decision because strategically it’s a big question mark whether, if they join that Board individually or collectively, it would really make a difference for them when it comes to the US stance on Ukraine or on tariffs. I doubt it – and I’m not the only one. Most EU countries have been cautious or declined to sign up so far, which reflects serious questions about the Board’s mandate and governance rather than simply reluctance to engage. Certainly if half of the EU countries join and half don’t, that would make the EU look very weak in the US’s eyes and confirm what Trump already thinks about Europeans.”
Bosse frames the question as not only strategic but also normative, cautioning against legitimizing a system where loyalty and money eclipse international law:
“In terms of principles, it’s a question of whether the EU would support or legitimise a system in which loyalty and money outweigh international law. This is also reflected in internal EU discussions about the governance structure, which many see as concentrated around Trump and at odds with established multilateral norms. Also, it could further dilute Europe’s voice because member states might take different positions. The overall question is what the Europeans can build up in response.”
Bosse notes that some experts in Davos framed the choice as stark: adapt, align, or oppose. She articulates the strategic challenge facing Europe:
“California’s Democratic governor, Gavin Newsom, put it quite bluntly when he said that Trump is like a T-rex – you either mate with him or he devours you. The third option, of course, is to fight back. But then the real question is: how can Europe actually do that? The first step has to be acting as a united EU and trying to influence the Board of Peace from the outside.”
“California’s Democratic governor, Gavin Newsom, put it quite bluntly when he said that Trump is like a T-rex – you either mate with him or he devours you”
She suggests Europe could exert influence through financial leverage, adding that international legitimacy still matters to Trump, even if Europeans are not essential for funding, which could be provided by the Gulf states who already agreed to join the board:
“It’s true that Trump doesn’t necessarily need European money, but European support matters for political legitimacy. Just look at Greenland: Europeans stood together and pushed back, and in the end he had to back down. As long as the EU stays united and has a plan, it has leverage.”
Russia’s game
Addressing Russia’s engagement in the board that is still unclear, Bosse interprets Moscow’s move as tactical rather than substantive:
“Russia is careful not to confront or openly disappoint Trump, particularly in the context of the war against Ukraine. Their strategy is to give him just enough to appear cooperative – engaging in peace talks that ultimately lead nowhere. We’ve seen this repeatedly, including in recent days. It’s about keeping Trump satisfied: offering him something he wants to hear from time to time, without changing their actual position.”
She situates this within Russia’s broader geopolitical goals:
“Putin remains deeply suspicious of the West. His objective is to position Russia as a major regional, and ideally global, power – something he cannot achieve by aligning with a US-led vision of global order. Although Russia’s miscalculations in Ukraine have weakened its influence in the Middle East, including Syria and possibly Iran, this has not altered Putin’s underlying view of how Russia should be positioned in the world.”
Trump Inc.
On the broader implications for multilateralism, Bosse sees the Peace Board not as a rupture but as an intensification of existing trends:
“The broader trend of a declining multilateral world order is not new. Trump tends to act as an accelerator of existing dynamics. His scepticism toward international organisations – his belief that the UN no longer functions and that American interests cannot be effectively pursued through multilateral institutions – is something we have heard before. What is distinctive is his conviction that the world order should be run through US-led structures, or even more narrowly, by Trump himself. It’s essentially “Trump Inc”.”
She stresses the need for democracies and middle powers to coordinate, even amid compromises:
“The EU already brings together small, middle, and larger powers, and collectively they have real weight – if they act in a coordinated way. In a world where the old multilateral order is widely seen as ruptured, and where great-power rivalry is structural, middle powers mustn’t wait for others but work together to shape outcomes rather than be subject to them. That means deepening strategic cooperation not only within Europe but also with other like-minded democracies such as Canada, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Ultimately, democracies cooperate more reliably than autocracies, but that cooperation needs concrete institutional backing and shared strategy.”
Bosse emphasises that while the Board of Peace is being widely discussed in media and by politicians, important aspects are missing:
“Nobody has asked what the Palestinian population actually wants. It’s fundamentally worrying that in all this talk about Gaza, redevelopment and reconstruction, the voice of Gazans is barely mentioned. Many people there see these plans as detached from their reality – focusing on grand economic visions or foreign governance structures without grounding them in what residents actually say they need. We know that most want local governance supported by the international community, not a foreign authority imposed from above. They want to rebuild their homes, protect their rights and determine their own political future. Ignoring that risks becoming neo-colonialism.”
Another important angle that’s missing from the public debate, according to the expert, is gender imbalance within the Board’s leadership:
“Another important angle largely missing from the public debate is the stark gender imbalance within the Peace Board’s leadership. There is not a single woman on the executive board, and only two on the Gaza board, making it a deeply male-dominated organisation. Such setups tend to reproduce political cultures shaped by male elites, where leaders present themselves as the ones who will “solve” everything, rather than opening decision-making to broader voices. This pattern is well known from many authoritarian and deeply hierarchical systems, where male leadership norms dominate and women are structurally sidelined from meaningful agenda-setting and authority. Research on peace processes shows that excluding women is not only unfair but also self-defeating: women’s meaningful participation is associated with more comprehensive agreements, higher implementation rates, and more durable peace. Against this backdrop, a peace initiative whose leadership remains almost entirely male undermines its own legitimacy and risks repeating precisely the failures that decades of women, peace and security advocacy have sought to overcome,” Bosse concludes.
Prof Giselle Bosse is a Full Professor and holds a personal chair in EU External Democracy Promotion, as well as the Jean Monnet Chair in EU Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University. She is also a Fellow at the European Democracy Hub in Brussels.
