Four years after the Ukraine invasion: Where does Europe stand on security?

February 24 marks four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The conflict, which reshaped Europe’s sense of security, was high on the agenda at last week’s Munich Security Conference. Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Dr Petar Petrov, Assistant Professor in International Relations and European Foreign Policy at Maastricht University, about the key messages of the conference and the long-term implications for EU defence policy.

Four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Petrov believes the changes it triggered in the European Union’s security and defence policies are permanent. He argues that Europe will not simply return to its pre-war reliance on the US, even if the war ends or US leadership changes:

Back to normal?

“I don’t foresee a situation where, for example, after a few years, with a new American administration, or even, let’s hope when the war ends, the Europeans just go back to life as usual or back to normal. I see the changes as permanent because it simply demonstrated to what extent European defence capabilities are exposed when the Americans are not engaged in the way that they used to be. The current wake-up call is not just a wake-up call. It is a cry for action. Also, with everything that is happening on the level of political rhetoric about the end of the international rules-based order, that directly cuts into the extent to which the Europeans can rely on their partnership with the Americans. Therefore, we have to forge our relationship closer and stronger together.”

“The current wake-up call is not just a wake-up call. It is a cry for action”

The expert underlines that what the Europeans are doing in security and defence – a concerted effort towards a more integrated European common defence policy – is unprecedented:

“It has been said for many years that only if we move to a more Europe-led, Europe-centred way of decision-making and prioritizing in this policy area will we make a difference as a global security actor. However, until now, there were no strong enough external crises to push the Europeans to really do that. And now things are moving very quickly – we’re talking about, for example, a  2025–2030 Defence Strategy, including Readiness 2030 Plan (prioritising the development of Air and Missile defence Artillery systems; Ammunition and missiles; Drones and counter drones systems, Military mobility; AI, Quantum, Cyber and Electronic warfare; Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection); or the “ ReArm Europe” Plan that provides funds of close to €800 billion in the next 5 years to boost defence investment and industrial production of European defence capabilities. So I see this whole process only going forward, and becoming even more detailed in the coming years.”

Negotiations

Petrov also addressed remarks made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the Munich Security Conference, where the Ukrainian president called Europe’s absence from peace negotiations with Russia and the United States “a big mistake.” The expert explains that this reflects both Europe’s military limitations and the inevitable political dynamics shaping the negotiations:

“First of all, the fact that we don’t have serious military capabilities, and we are currently not a serious military actor only partially explains why the Europeans are not present in those negotiations. The more the EU becomes a stronger military actor alongside its existing diplomatic clout, the harder it will be to disregard it. But there is something bigger at play here. Unfortunately, this peace process is a pet project of the American president. It’s a personal project of peace-making greatness. In that respect, the Europeans are not wanted there by the American president himself, because they will not necessarily play along in the way he wants. Often, the American approach is more accommodating to the Russian demands than focused on what will underpin long-term European and Ukrainian security. The American president is thinking more in terms of achieving a quick deal, regardless of the real effect on long-term security, while the Europeans oppose that. Therefore, they are seen as an obstacle and therefore are not wanted as a partner by the US.”

Russia, too, has repeatedly portrayed the EU as irrelevant to the negotiations. Petrov rejects that characterization, arguing that Europe has been essential in sustaining Ukraine’s position:

Indirectly part of negotiations

“The Europeans are actually quite relevant, because without the Europeans, the Ukrainians would never have been able to bounce back from so many setbacks as quickly as they have in the past year — diplomatically and now militarily. This demonstrates that they are firmly part of this negotiating process even if indirectly. In any peace negotiation process, the side that is losing on the battlefield normally is the side that accepts the peace conditions. The Ukrainians have not been left in a position where they are losing to the extent that they must accept Moscow’s conditions, and since the beginning of Trump’s presidency, this is entirely thanks to the Europeans. Ironically, and unfortunately, the Russians see the Americans more as an ally and hence as a more neutral than the Europeans negotiator. In fact, the Americans themselves see the Europeans as not neutral, but as exclusively supporting the Ukrainian side.”

Looking ahead, Petrov argues that Europe’s diplomatic, military, and economic strengths will be crucial in shaping any lasting settlement:

“If there is going to be any activation of the Coalition of the Willing initiative it will be predominantly the Europeans (including the UK) who will deploy troops on the ground. The EU has enormous strengths that it can confidently play on: global trade partnerships; financial support to Kiyv; production capacities for Ukraine’s defence industry; money and other economic stimuli for European R&D and innovation. We are also talking about the mushrooming of major bilateral investment agreements for joint armaments production between Ukraine and key EU member states (Denmark, Germany, Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Poland, to mention but a few). The EU can outproduce Russia and it can squeeze it economically if it so decides and if it firmly acts on it.

“It is crucial to note that everything that is being done right now in the security and defence domain in Europe is meant to not only achieve European strategic autonomy but simultaneously strengthen the European pillar within NATO“

Strategic plan

It is crucial to note that everything that is being done right now in the security and defence domain in Europe is meant to not only achieve European strategic autonomy but simultaneously strengthen the European pillar within NATO. If the Europeans manage to do this successfully,  they will be capable to keep the Americans closer and ‘in the game’ for their strategic enablers, especially intelligence sharing, within NATO. So whatever is now playing out on the political level, where acrimonious rhetoric may dominate the public discourse, practical cooperation between the Europeans, and the Americans continues within NATO. The Europeans are doing the best they can in a very difficult diplomatic situation. And the fact that they are now doing so much means that this cooperation will continue as long as they get their act together in the security and defence domain.”

Petrov also believes that Ukraine’s EU accession and deeper European defence integration will continue regardless of how the war evolves. He argues that stalemate, escalation, or settlement would all reinforce Europe’s strategic role:

“Neither enlargement policy, especially towards Ukraine, nor security and defence integration will stop or be undermined. I don’t foresee that. In fact, in all three scenarios I see reasons for a strong European role. In case of a stalemate, the Europeans will ensure that Ukraine can continue fighting and producing its own weapons systems. In an escalation, the Europeans could demonstrate their readiness to deploy troops, with American backing, in roles such as protecting critical infrastructure or border security, allowing Ukrainian forces to focus elsewhere. And in the case of a settlement, enlargement will become a key factor in keeping Ukraine firmly anchored within the European Union and its alliance of partners. There will be complex negotiations, because Ukraine is a large country. European integration itself may evolve potentially creating different concentric circles of integration to accommodate Ukraine more quickly without disrupting the existing system. But in all these scenarios, I see the European Union staying firmly on course with security integration and enlargement, because only in that way can it effectively support Ukraine.”

“The Europeans are doing the best they can in a very difficult diplomatic situation“

Article 42.7

Petrov also commented on European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call to operationalize the EU’s mutual defence clause, Article 42.7. He argues that the clause strengthens European security cooperation but does not replace NATO:

“I don’t expect that Article 42.7 will lead to the Americans pulling out of NATO. First of all, the article is designed as complementary to NATO. Secondly, there has already been a precedent. After the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, France invoked Article 42.7, so we know how it works. The article mandates that if an EU state is a victim of armed aggression, other member states have an obligation to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power. This can actually be interpreted as a stronger commitment than NATO’s Article 5, which allows member states more national discretion in choosing their response.

Article 42.7 also has a broader scope, covering different forms of aggression, including cyberattacks or lower-threshold conflicts, and allows for not only military, but also financial, political, and humanitarian assistance. However, NATO’s Article 5 remains backed by a far more developed institutional and military planning framework, making it a more immediate operational guarantee. The EU is still developing its capacity in that regard. So no, I do not expect this article to replace NATO. Rather, it is being used as a rallying cry to encourage Europeans to make full use of the security commitments already present in EU treaties.”

New international rules?

Petrov also reflected on recent statements by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz that the rules-based international order “no longer exists.” He argues that this reflects not the end of rules, but the need to rebuild and reinforce them:

“In my opinion, nobody is fully prepared for a world without rules. Even the United States and other major powers would not benefit from a system in which security depends purely on force. When leaders say that the rules-based order no longer exists, they mean that the illusion of stability is over. Middle and smaller powers must work more closely together to rebuild a system based on shared values such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and human rights.

“We are moving towards a new phase, where Europe takes greater responsibility while still working with its allies to maintain a predictable and stable international system“

This is not about abandoning the rules-based order, but about reforming and strengthening it so that it becomes more resilient and effective. European leaders continue to emphasize the importance of NATO, transatlantic cooperation, and a stronger European role within that framework. We are moving towards a new phase, where Europe takes greater responsibility while still working with its allies to maintain a predictable and stable international system.”