“If Orbán stays in power, Hungary will become even more marginalised”: Why Hungarian elections matter for the EU

As tensions between Brussels and Budapest deepen, Hungary is becoming increasingly isolated within the European Union. While EU leaders struggle to navigate the ongoing standoff with Hungary over support for Ukraine, recent reports that the country’s Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó may have shared sensitive details from EU discussions with Russia have further eroded trust among member states. For many in Brussels, the episode reinforces long-standing concerns about Hungary’s positioning within the Union under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

All of this is unfolding just weeks before Hungary heads to the polls in what could be the most consequential election in Europe this year. After 16 years in power, Orbán faces a serious challenge, raising the prospect not only of domestic political change, but of a major shift in Hungary’s relationship with the European Union. Studio Europa Maastricht spoke with Ferenc Laczó, Assistant Professor of European History at Maastricht University, about what is at stake.

Join the discussion about Hungary’s future in the EU with Laczó and other experts on April 9 at the Lumière cinema by registering here.

Most consequential

According to Laczó, the Hungarian elections is the most consequential in the EU this year, which may seem surprising at first but the context makes them uniquely important:

“Hungary is not usually the country where you would expect the most important election in the EU in any given year. But there are two reasons. One is that there are no major elections this year in the large EU member states. Hungary is, of course, a mid-sized country, and while there are elections elsewhere none of those are as contested. What makes the Hungarian election so significant is that it is really about both the internal direction of the country and its foreign policy. This is, in a way, a referendum on the Orbán regime. Orbán has now been in power for 16 consecutive years, and he has built up a new form of state, which is a very strange hybrid, often described as an illiberal state within a liberal union.

“Orbán has now been in power for 16 consecutive years, and he has built up a new form of state, which is a very strange hybrid, often described as an illiberal state within a liberal union“

So the question is whether this system remains sufficiently popular, and whether it can be defeated at the ballot box. And if it is defeated, what that would mean, because this is a regime that controls so many resources and institutions. What would it imply if it actually lost a democratic election? I think we’re going to witness an extremely interesting moment, and a very important election for the EU as a whole.”

Reflecting on the growing frustration against Budapest in Brussels and the apparent lack of effective EU action, Laczó points to both long-term dynamics:

“If Orbán gets re-elected, I think he will continue on this collision course. This has been his line for quite some years, but it’s also been a gradual process of increased confrontation. He was much more cooperative in the early 2010s but then he was forced out of the EPP due to his illiberal remaking of Hungary. I think 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, was a major turning point. Since then, Orbán has stepped up his actions in a way that increasingly disregards the common position of the EU. He’s ready to be a real nuisance in this respect. The EU approach, for a long time, has been quite soft, trying to bring him back into the fold but this has not really worked.”

At the same time, transatlantic relations are in a significant crisis, which also impacts relations between Budapest and Brussels, the expert adds:

“Within the EU there are forces quite close to Trump. The Orbán regime is one of the clearest examples of that. It is a kind of symbolic foreign policy they are performing which doesn’t translate into much materially for members of Hungarian society. Hungary is simply too intertwined with other European economies and too dependent on European funding for such a foreign policy to qualify as reasonable. But if Orbán stays in power, Hungary will likely become even more marginalized in EU affairs, unless there is a broader rightward shift within the EU. If the opposition wins, however, the EU faces a dilemma: how lenient to be.”

Opponent Péter Magyar

Analysing the role of Orbán’s main opponent Péter Magyar and whether new leadership could replicate elements of the current system, Laczó points to Magyar’s political background:

“Péter Magyar comes from the right, he was part of Fidesz for most of his life. In a way, he is using national populism against the illiberal state. His politics are somewhat national-populist in style, but he does defend core liberal values in substance. That might actually be a useful combination under current circumstances, because you need to appeal to an electorate that has been shaped by this kind of politics.

But we don’t really know what kind of democratic leader he would be. There is always a risk with strong, charismatic leaders. Orbán himself was once seen as a potentially constructive figure, almost like a De Gaulle-type leader. So the question is whether Magyar can transition from being a very dynamic and successful opposition figure to someone who will govern in a more open, democratic and effective way. At this point, nobody really knows the answer.”

“Orbán himself was once seen as a potentially constructive figure, almost like a De Gaulle-type leader”

Turning to the importance of institutional power, the expert highlights the decisive role of a potential two-thirds parliamentary majority:

“Without a two-thirds majority, many of the changes Fidesz implemented since 2010 would not have been possible. If Magyar’s party wins by a large enough margin, the electoral system could again produce such a supermajority. And then the dilemma becomes very real. On the one hand, it would allow for a much more thorough restoration of democracy. On the other hand, it could also be abused to dominate the new system. This is exactly what has happened under Orbán.”

Asked about Magyar’s potential positioning in Brussels, Laczó describes a balancing act between European alignment and domestic nationalism:

“He is currently in the EPP and leans to the right. To win the election, he needs both opposition voters and a significant share of right-wing voters, which explains his current positioning. I think he will try to do two things at the same time: be on good terms with the EU and the liberal West, while also maintaining a nationalistic tone domestically. Interestingly, this is very similar to Orbán’s own position during his first time as PM from 1998 to2002.”

Addressing concerns about potential authoritarian escalation, Laczó argues that a Belarus-style scenario is unlikely, despite heightened tensions during the ongoing election campaign:

“The EU is actually more popular in Hungary than the government often suggests – or the EU seems ready to admit. Orbán constantly mobilizes against Brussels, but this reflects a minority position that has to be reinforced. His strategy has always been to act assertively, even controversially, but still remain within the basic EU framework. A full authoritarian crackdown would be extremely risky for Fidesz. What is more likely is that he uses the threat of escalation to create a sense that the election is existentially important. But I don’t think he actually wants to cross that line.

The real issue is different: even if the opposition wins, that doesn’t automatically dismantle the regime. Magyar will need to find a way to really change the system where so many power positions are occupied by people who have been appointed by Fidesz. To put it somewhat cynically, Fidesz may not need an authoritarian crackdown despite its unpopularity and potential electoral loss because it may still control the system in more subtle ways in the coming years.”

EU and democracy

Placing the Hungarian elections within a broader European context, the contemporary historian underlines that they may serve as a test of the EU’s commitment to democracy:

“I belong to a generation that at some point rather naively believed that the EU guarantees democracy, and that it is a strong defender of democratic norms and values. That’s certainly how it was presented to us in Eastern Europe when we were young. And then it turned out that this is not really true. The EU has been quite disappointing for us, I would say, because we were very pro-European and had high expectations and hopes. But it turned out that democracy wasn’t so important for the EU.

The EU cares about economic freedoms and the rule of law, it’s a kind of economic and legalistic project. The democratic dimension is often alluded to without being truly secured. Hungary is the best example of that. I don’t think anyone seriously maintains that Hungary is a full-fledged democracy today, and yet it remains a full member of the Union. The Union has really struggled to deal with that and hasn’t found an effective response.

“I don’t think anyone seriously maintains that Hungary is a full-fledged democracy today, and yet it remains a full member of the Union“

From my point of view, this has been a major failure. Even now, the EU is trying to bring Hungary back onto the right path through financial incentives like withdrawing funds, then bargaining over them, which creates a very ambiguous situation. Either basic rules are violated or they are not; it cannot be the subject of a compromise because then my rights will be partially violated.”

With the global rise of illiberalism becoming a clear trend, Laczó argues that the EU needs to invest much more seriously in pro-democratic initiatives:

“In the past, many of these efforts were supported by American actors – NGOs, foundations, sometimes government-linked – but that has changed massively in recent months. So the EU will have to step up. Hungary could become a major example, a kind of laboratory for re-democratisation, for unmaking a long-standing illiberal rule. If the EU wants to have a case where it demonstrates that it has that democratising capacity, this would be the perfect opportunity, because Hungary is a relatively small country, where people are still quite pro-European, and they remember what a more democratic system looked like 20 years ago. So the preconditions for a real success are there. The question is whether the EU is willing to act more decisively than it has in the past.”