Dit interview is in het Engels
Propaganda and disinformation are often discussed as urgent threats to democracy, particularly when foreign actors attempt to influence elections. But political communication has long been shaped by international influence, commercial media interests and competing national narratives. How should we understand these developments in the context of today’s transatlantic relationship?
Studio Europa spoke with Betto van Waarden, Assistant Professor of History at Maastricht University, who researches the relationship between mass media and politics, about the influence of propaganda and disinformation on relations between Europe and the United States.
Van Waarden will share his insights at our upcoming event, “Europe’s response room: Navigating the perfect storm after the US Midterms”. Join the conversation by registering here.
America sets the pace
The US and Europe have developed different media traditions, shaped partly by their respective political systems, national histories and commercial interests. According to Van Waarden, many of the innovations that have influenced modern political communication originated in the United States before spreading to Europe.
“The US has usually been the leader in new media revolutions. Already in the nineteenth century, you had the penny press, which sold newspapers at prices below cost to compete with other newspapers. These were very aggressive, cutthroat capitalist tactics that did not exist in Europe to the same extent. The US also pioneered forms of journalism that focused more on human interest: the personalities involved in politics, the atmosphere in Congress and the people behind political decisions. In more recent times, this has contributed to what we call horse-race reporting, where the focus is on who is ahead, what the polls say and who is falling behind, rather than on the substance of political debates.”
Europe has often lagged behind the US, but it has adopted many of these innovations, the expert adds:
“However, some developments were harder to reproduce in smaller European countries. The US has one large media market, where content can reach a huge audience in English. In the Netherlands, for example, there was simply not the same large commercial market for popular magazines and image-based media in the early days. This has meant that the US has developed a more commercialised and innovative media landscape, with some more extreme consequences for politics. Celebrity politics, for example, has generally been more pronounced in the US than in Europe.”
Van Waarden also points to differences in journalistic traditions on the other side of the Atlantic:
“In the US, investigative journalism has historically placed a strong emphasis on finding facts and establishing what happened. In continental Europe, particularly in the French and German traditions, the media have more often been understood as a public sphere in which arguments and debate should take place.”
Propaganda goes both ways
Despite these differences, European and American political actors have consistently borrowed ideas and strategies from one another. Van Waarden sees this exchange as a longstanding feature of political communication, rather than a recent development driven by social media:
“Politicians always look across borders for innovations. Think, for example, of the Dutch elections and D66’s use of the slogan ‘Yes, we can’, which was originally associated with Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. Dutch political communications specialists have also spent time in the US learning from American electoral campaigns. There is certainly a lot of copycat behaviour. But this exchange goes back much further. During the First World War, Britain operated a secret propaganda office in New York to persuade Americans to join the Allied side. How do you convince American citizens to send their children across the world to die in a European war that they might feel has nothing to do with them? That requires a huge information effort.”
British propaganda was effective and remained a secret while other operations weren’t as successful, the expert points out:
“Germany also operated a secret propaganda office in the US, but it was uncovered and became a scandal. These kinds of activities were not unique to one country. But propaganda can also create problems for the relationships it is meant to strengthen. During the First World War, American soldiers arrived in Europe and discovered that some of the stories they had read in the media had been exaggerated or were simply false. They realised they had been exposed to British propaganda, which created disillusionment on the American side.”
One of the reasons that the British operation succeeded was the type of people involved in it, Van Waarden explains:
“The British brought people from the new commercial media and marketing industries into government communication. The Americans did something similar. One argument is that the Allies benefitted from using professional marketers who understood the logic of modern mass media, while the Germans relied more heavily on bureaucrats who did not understand how to persuade audiences. Hitler himself admired British propaganda: it was simple, black and white without shades of grey, and divided the world into heroes and villains. He believed that Germany needed to learn from this commercialised approach.”
When nothing seems true
The history of political communication also offers a different perspective on contemporary concerns about foreign interference. Russian disinformation campaigns, in particular, have alarmed many in Europe. Van Waarden argues that these activities should be taken seriously, but that their significance needs to be assessed in proportion to their actual influence:
“New technologies and AI make some things different, but that does not mean the underlying problem is new. We have always had propaganda and political interference. We should take them seriously, but we should not panic. We need to approach these challenges calmly and maturely. Consider the attention given to Russian interference in elections. It can be a very attractive story for the media. It fits existing stereotypes and narratives about Russia as an adversary, and it attracts attention because it appears to reveal a foreign threat to our democracies. That does not mean the interference is necessarily false, but we need to distinguish between the existence of a problem and its actual scale.”
According to the expert, research from the past decade suggests that Russian disinformation has existed, but that its overall scale and influence have often remained relatively limited:
“Russia has been effective at amplifying and exaggerating grievances that already exist in Western societies. It can exploit divisions around immigration or other political issues, but it did not create those divisions from nothing. People in Europe and the US are already capable of polarising themselves. Some research on online algorithms has even suggested that algorithmic recommendations lead users towards less polarising content than the content they actively seek out themselves. Another thing is that Russia is an easy scapegoat. If politicians dislike an election result, they can blame Russian disinformation. That does not mean foreign interference never happens. It means that we should not automatically attribute domestic political developments to foreign actors.”
The expert points to the 2016 US election as one of the examples:
“During the 2016 US election it was reported that 126 million Americans had been exposed to Russian content on Facebook. That sounds enormous, but it tells us very little without considering the total amount of information people consumed. One estimate put this Russian content at only 0.004% of the information Americans consumed on Facebook during that period. The important question is not simply how many people might have encountered a piece of disinformation, but what effect it actually had on them.”
Van Waarden also cautions against treating citizens as passive recipients of false information. People are often more capable of distinguishing between fact and falsehood than public debates about disinformation suggest.
“We should not assume that citizens are simply gullible people who believe everything they see. Research on propaganda has shown that people can be quite good at distinguishing facts from falsehoods. Most citizens consume relatively little news as part of their overall information diet – most of it is entertainment – and only a small proportion of that news is fake. Estimates suggest that fake news has accounted for around 0.1 to 0.15 % of the media diet consumed by Americans in recent years, although the precise figures depend on how fake news is defined and measured. If someone encounters a manipulated Russian video, that does not automatically change their political views. A single piece of false information is unlikely to turn a VVD voter into a PRO voter, or the other way around. We need to understand how people actually consume and interpret information, rather than assuming that every encounter with disinformation produces a political effect.”
For Van Waarden, the most serious consequence of disinformation may not be that people believe a particular false story, but that they begin to distrust information altogether:
“If we keep telling people not to trust everything they read or hear, they can eventually start distrusting everything. But trust is the basis of democracy, including trust in information. Studies in the US have shown that citizens have estimated that 60 to 65 % of the content they encounter on social media is fake. That is nowhere near the actual proportion. Most of the information people see is not fake, but the perception that everything might be false can still have consequences.”
The challenge, then, is not only to identify false information, but also to avoid undermining the public’s confidence in reliable sources of information.
“This is also where propaganda can work by spreading cynicism. It does not necessarily need to convince people that one particular story is true. It can simply make them question whether anything is true at all. When people no longer trust information, they may stop caring about what is happening. They become apathetic and disengaged, and that makes it more difficult to mobilise citizens or organise political opposition. This is why flooding the public sphere with contradictory claims and nonsense can be so dangerous. If people are overwhelmed by information, it becomes harder to establish what is true and harder for political organisations to communicate effectively.”
A relationship built on stories
The same logic of persuasion has also shaped the relationship between Europe and the US. Although the two are often portrayed as natural allies, Van Waarden argues that their historical relationship has been more complicated than this narrative suggests.
“We tend to assume that Europe and the US have always been friends, as if this relationship were natural. But the US was founded precisely to be different from Europe. People emigrated from Europe to establish their own country, one that was deliberately designed not to be like the societies they had left behind. To create a transatlantic relationship, therefore, required a great deal of propaganda. I use the word ‘propaganda’ here in its original neutral sense, but after the World Wars ‘propaganda’ became a dirty word reserved for the information campaigns of enemies, and Western countries started describing their own information campaigns as ‘public relations’ or ‘cultural diplomacy’. The story of a ‘special relationship’ between Europe and the US has itself been actively constructed through the media and through information.”
The line between persuasion and propaganda is quite thin, the expert elaborates:
“We often associate propaganda with authoritarian regimes, but democracies have historically had a particular need to persuade people. Authoritarian governments can use repression and violence to maintain power. Democratic leaders need to convince large groups of citizens because those citizens can vote. This is why democracies have played such an important role in the development of modern propaganda. Governments need people to believe in a particular cause, support a policy, or identify with an alliance.”
Van Waarden points to the post-war period as an example of how these narratives developed. The Marshall Plan, commonly remembered as a decisive American effort to rebuild Europe, also served an important political and communicative purpose.
“The Marshall Plan is an incredibly powerful symbol. Today, whenever we face a major challenge, whether climate change or another crisis, people talk about the need for a new Marshall Plan. Materially, the impact of the Plan actually remained limited, but the Marshall Plan ‘brand’ was popularised through an extremely effective public relations campaign. The $13.3 billion the US provided, much of which benefitted its own economy as 83% of it was used to purchase American products, ‘only’ contributed less than 0.5% to Europe’s GDP growth. But the campaign helped create the feeling among Western Europeans that America had their back. It helped establish a relationship of trust between Western Europe and the US at the beginning of the Cold War – even if this Atlantic alliance arguably also fuelled this emerging division between West and East.”
Information became central to this conflict, the expert emphasizes:
“The Cold War was not a military confrontation but a form of psychological warfare. Both sides tried to shape how people understood the world. The Americans spread information intended to influence opinion both in the Soviet Union and internationally. Meanwhile, exploiting public fear about the spread of AIDS in the early 1980s, the KGB unit in New York started a highly successful disinformation campaign that the US military had secretly developed the HIV virus as a biological weapon and lost control – undermining trust in the American government both within and outside the US. By his time, the Soviets spent no less than three billion dollars per year on such disinformation campaigns.”
For Van Waarden, the appeal of American presidents in Europe also demonstrates how media narratives can outlast political realities.
“Barack Obama was an extraordinary media figure in Europe. During his campaign, around 200,000 people gathered in Berlin to see him. That is remarkable when you consider that an American presidential candidate would not normally attract such a crowd in Germany. He was extremely good at playing the media, and the image of Obama that developed in Europe remained powerful long after his initial popularity began to decline in the US. Even when he encountered a post-Midterms Congress that constrained his policymaking at home, and actually neglected America’s ‘special relationship’ with Europe in favour of his strategic ‘Pivot to Asia,’ the European image of Obama remained largely positive.”
Allies, but not always aligned
Despite the strength of this shared narrative, Van Waarden argues that the transatlantic relationship has always been marked by disagreements, and the differences in how Europeans and Americans remember the World Wars help explain many of the tensions in the transatlantic relationship.
“The US looks back at the World Wars and thinks: we came in and saved the day, we saved Europe. And from that perspective, you can understand the American frustration. Why aren’t Europeans more grateful? Why aren’t they willing to help us fight wars to free other people from dictators? We freed them from Hitler, so why can’t they help us free the Iraqis from Saddam, who killed hundreds of thousands of his own people, including with chemical weapons? But on the European side, the memory of the World Wars is very different. The wars brought total devastation to Europe. They were fought on European soil, as well as in parts of Asia and Africa, but not on American soil. So Europeans have a very different memory of what war means.”
This background makes Europeans more reluctant to engage in military conflicts, Van Waarden continues:
“Europeans are more hesitant to go off and fight wars in places like Iraq or Iran because they have a more cynical, pessimistic view of war and its destruction. It is not so much about going in and saving the day. This difference in historical memory is important for understanding the transatlantic relationship and how Europeans and Americans approach international policy.”
Van Waarden argues that these tensions go back much further than today’s political disagreements.
“Anti-Europeanism has a long history, just as anti-Americanism does. Initially, anti-Americanism was often about opposition to capitalism and consumerism. The French, for example, saw European integration partly as a way of countering American influence in Europe. More recently, anti-American sentiment has also been driven by US foreign policy, particularly after the Iraq War – although such anti-war sentiments also go back to Vietnam.”
According to the expert, there is also a more functional aspect to all this when we talk about ‘crises’.
“Both the US and Europe have a long tradition of exaggerating crises to increase military spending and expand state powers – think of state censorship and mass surveillance. The US was much more powerful than the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, but it repeatedly exaggerated the Soviet threat to justify its ever-expanding defence budget. The EU does something similar, in a way. There is this idea that European integration happens through crises: that crises bring us together and show why we need a bigger EU budget. And I don’t want to dismiss that, because it can be important. But there is a political interest in calling something a ‘crisis’ – in marketing and framing it even as a ‘polycrisis’ – because it also has to do with money and power,” the expert concludes.

Betto van Waarden is Assistant Professor of History at Maastricht University. He researches the history of politics and mass media in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He has focused on the personalization of politics, parliamentary communication, the attention economy, and transnational public spheres. His new research interests include truth & democracy, time & politics, and the interdisciplinary study of attention.
